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Memory and Image 
 




1. Manet’s chain 
Tradition (transmission of cultural values) in general can be a very abstract issue if 
one does not refer to specific objects which perform as carriers or vehicles or supports 
of the transmission itself. 
Art history is among the historical disciplines perhaps (from this point of view, at 
least) a happy discipline, since it can investigate material, real objects such as works of 
art: such carriers are much more tangible than, for instance, the objects with which the 
history of ideas or the history of folklore usually work, which are sometimes opinions 
not even recorded on written texts. 
One possible way of practicing art history as a history of the cultural tradition is to 
establish a “chain” among the artistic phenomena, so that the last phenomenon is the 
most derivate, and determined by the previous degrees influencing it (as regards forms, 
themes, styles, and so on), up to the origin of the chain itself as a the Prime Mover, the 
primum momentum agens. Such method has something to do (although it is not identical 
with) an aetiological (causalistic – deterministic) approach based on the cause-effect 
model, and it seems quite close to the genealogical “family tree” which reconstructs the 
origins of a family through the different levels of kinship. 
Let’s see an example of a chain in art history, drawn from the work of one of the 
most influential art (and culture) historians of late 19th – early 20th century: Aby 
Warburg (1866-1929). In his last years Warburg studied Edouard Manet’s Dejeuner sur 
l’herbe (fig.1), and was enthusiastically excited when (leaning on previous studies by 
Gustav Pauli) he could trace back the origin of it – through the 17° (fig.2)  and the 16th 
century (fig.3) – in a hellenistic relief (the front part of an ancient sarcophagus) which is 
to be seen immured in a wall of Villa Medici in Rome (fig.4).  
A chain which could be perhaps properly represented either in the right-side way, 
stressing the movement performed by the art historian from the derivate image to its 
source, or in the left-side way, stressing the relation of cause-effect within art history 
itself:  
Construction-path Reconstruction-path 
Villa Medici Villa Medici 
↓ ↑ 
[Raffaello] lost [Raffaello] lost 
↓ ↑ 












Of course, the chain can be continued far beyond Manet (and Warburg): for example, 
in a kitschy (or ironic?) acrylic on tin by pop-artist Isabel Samaras (Déjeuner,1996).  
 
We could provisionally say that the last, unachieved, huge project elaborated by 
Warburg, the so-called “Mnemosyne-Atlas”, had to be according to its author a sort of 
map of the imaginative chains building Western figurative memory. To the same task 
Warburg devoted his Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek (Library of culture-science) in 
Hamburg, which is nowadays still active in London (Warburg Institute) as an 
interdisciplinary center for studies in the humanities with particular stress on the visual 
expression.  
 
2. Matter and memory (matter is memory) 
As some of his theoretical annotations scattered throughout his intellectual life – 
from some early passages of notebooks sketched in the Nineties to the year of his death 
(1929) – seem to attest, Warburg, according to the general cultural atmosphere of his 
age, inclined to interpret such cultural image-chains, in the sense of a biological 
heredity, following some post-darwinian German theorists as the physiologist Ewald 
Hering (1834-1918) and his follower, the zoologist Richard Semon (1859-1918).  
The “family-tree”, as a graphic model often adopted by such approaches, 
immediateley and intuitively shows that here we have to do with individual phenomena 
as long as they are included in a network of relations to other individual phenomena, so 
that the whole result is to be understood as a social or collective complex.  
The issue of the memory of images is therefore inscribed in the more general 
question of collective and social memory, whose effective existence – together with the 
existence of a collective and social conscience and unconscious – was taken as a matter 
of fact and hardly contested within the context of late 19th-early 20th century culture, 
particularly as regarded the psychological and sociological thought (we could here 
mention the heterogeneous names of Samuel Butler – who independently developed a 
theory very close to Hering’s and Semon’s –, of W.B. Yeats, L. Hearn, R.M. Rilke, 
Moeller van den Bruck, J. Burckhardt, E. Haeckel, A. Forel, B. Russell, E. Mach, S. 
Freud, C.G. Jung, M. Halbwachs).  
In a preparatory passage of the lecture on the Serpent Ritual (1923) Warburg writes: 
“The instruments of my library should help in answering the problem so well 
formulated by Hering: ‘Memory as organized matter’”. 
What is the meaning of this last sentence? It refers to the title of a famous lecture 
given by Hering in 1870: Über das Gedächtnis als eine allgemeine Funktion der 
organisierten Materie (On Memory as a General Function of Organized Matter). Hering 
conceives memory as a fundamental property of reproduction of organic beings. The 
nervous substance of any organism retains the traces of its experiences and hands them 
down as an inheritance to the following generations, just as she received in its turn a 
certain amount of traces from the previous generations. Such process, materially 
connecting each single organism – from the most elementary animal to man – to an 
infinite chain of previous and subsequent beings, is both constant and unconscious: 
“Therefore each organic being is in front of us as a product of the unconscious memory 
of the organized matter, which steadily increasing and dividing into parts, constantly 
assimilating new matter and always giving it back to the inorganic world, always 
assumes something new in its memory, to reproduce it over and over again”. 





It is not possible, here, to follow Hering in all the premises and consequences of his 
theory (regarding in general physiology and neurology in their historical development, 
in particular the controversial issue of heredity of acquired properties). I will not but 
underline some points important for Warburg’s perspective. 
We should consider that Hering explicitely refers to the oral and written literary 
traditions as to the “memory of humanity” only in a secondary sense, i.e. dependent on 
the material memory of the nervous substance, which preserves and reproduces not only 
the most primary and archaic physical needs (like hunger or reproduction, ruled by the 
so-called instinct), but the superior processes of conscience as well, like the 
conceptualisation in its different degrees, which is certainly not due to the work of the 
single individual, but rather to the effort of thousands years performed by the brain 
substance of millions of ancestors: a controversial point in theoretical biology which 
would have still been shielded from criticism by Freud in his essay on Moses (1934-38).  
In this sense, artists seem not to act differently from little chicks. The chick, just got 
out of the egg, not only demonstrates a remarkable skill in cohordinating its movements, 
but also the perceptive ability to notice the seeds one throws to it, exactly seizing the 
direction and measuring the distance separating itself from food. In performing such 
actions, it can base itself certainly not on the “personal” experience it could gain within 
the egg, but on the experience accumulated by thousands of beings which preceded it 
and from whom it descends. The simple stimulus of the perception of food on the retina 
triggers a chain-reproduction of a series of perceptions sensations volitions which are 
preserved by the memory of the species. 
  
3. Memory and image 
Warburg seems to have completed Hering’s allusion to the literary tradition on the 
side of visual culture: Warburg’s iconology (assumed in the widest sense of a theory of 
culture from the point of view of a theory of image) appears at the same time as a 
history of matter reflected in art as in its mirror or image.  
If we go back to the example of Manet’s chain, it is possible now to include it in the 
general context of Hering’s views, and even to understand why Warburg referred in 
some cases to the “task of social memory” as to a “mnemic function” and to the 
“function of the European collective memory as a force capable to shape styles”.  
 
• We could certainly raise the following objection to Hering’s theory and 
especially to Warburg’s use of it in a field (humanities) which is not easily 
reducible to mere laws of nature (the old debate of Geisteswissenschaften vs 
Naturwissenschaften!): artists are definitely not chicks, and Marcantonio 
Raimondi was deliberately looking at Raphael’s drawing as at a model, like 
Raphael himself had possibly looked at Villa Medici’s relief as at a prototype: all 
these are cases of conscious “imitation” or “inspiration” and cannot be reduced to 
an example of unconscious collective memory. But Hering specifies that, when 
an animal acts instinctively (that is on the basis of an ancestral memory), it does 
not simply operate as a blind mechanism, but – rather on the contrary – it 
performs its actions with consciousness (Hering’s perspective of organic life is 
monistic, therefore we would hardly find in his works a qualitative distinction of 
the human world on one side and the rest of organic world on the other side), 
knowing how to vary its operative processes corresponding to the changeable 
circumstances: the single organism is therefore subject to errors and 





improvements. The example here sounds Warburghian ante litteram: the 
liberation of the butterfly from its grub (Verpuppung der Raupe), that in Warburg 
would become the grub of Burgundian art which gets rid of the cocoon and 
transforms itself into Florentinian art. 
Moreover, the history of art is rich both of conscious, intentional voluntary 
resumptions of ancient artistic forms in following periods (for ex. in Ghirlandaio’s 
workshop the conscious use of models extracted from books of archeological 
drawings), and of unintentional revivals (for ex. in the case of the intellectuals of 
Reformation, who are somehow compulsively forced to resort to superstitious 
practices of astrological divination; or in the case of the Pueblo children in New 
Mexico, in whose drawings the thunderstorm is unintentionally represented through 
the archaic symbol of the snake-lightning).  
• Another objection that could be raised involves the possibility of the new, of the 
original (a quite recent obsession of the artist, if we consider the whole of art 
history; still Goethe would define himself nothing else but a “plagiarist”!). It could 
seem that, if any behaviour of any organism (chick or artist) is determined by the 
information received via heredity, it could be hardly possible to perform in a brand 
new way, and art would therefore be the eternal repetition of the identical (a sort of 
Nietzschean nightmare). Life (das Leben) would only literally be a Post-life (we 
could translate in this restrictive way the famous concept of Nachleben used by 
Warburg to describe the “survival” and “revival” of ancient forms in Renaissance 
art). As to this point, Hering maintains that certain properties of an individual can be 
transmitted to the derivated organism (organism-son) without having been inherited 
by the organism-parent itself, but just acquired in relation to the circumstances in 
which the organism-parent lived: any organism can therefore bequeath to its 
successor a “small heredity” added to the “big heredity of the entire species”. This 
guarantees, in Warburg’s perspective, the possibility that each single artist, although 
connected as an Aristotelian “second substance” (Cat. 5, 2a13) to the generations 
which preceded him or her (an issue which worried two of Warburg’s masters, Justi 
and Burckhardt), might bring to the chain of tradition his or her novum gained 
through his or her individual experiences. 
Any personal and individual variation and intervention, nevertheless, operates on the 
basis of an archaic foundation which is not more singular than plural, and which could 
not be properly attributed to any personal name (an anonymous background, what by 
the way connects Warburg to Wölfflin’s “art history with no names”, Kunstgeschichte 
ohne Namen). Hering’s stress on the basic, archaic instinctual needs helps us 
comprehending some of Warburg’s apparently quite odd allusions to a “substrate of an 
elementary humanity”; to a “comparative research of the eternally unalterable Red 
Indian living in the desolate human soul”; to the “identity or rather indestructibility of 
the primitive man, who remains the same in all the ages, so that I could identify him 
even as an organ of the early Florentine Renaissance, and later of the German 
Reformation”; finally to a “modern ‘homo non sapiens’”. 
Art (and more in general culture) is – against every theory of progressive 
improvement – a constant and also tragic re-elaboration of a past which does not pass. 
 
4. The mnemic trace 
But other problems and objections menace this heredity-theory transposed to the 
history of figurative culture. According to Hering’s perspective, heredity is – as we have 





seen – a form of material transmission of nervous substances modified by experience. It 
is very important to stress the fact that both for Hering and for Warburg the mnemonic 
or mnestic traces, imprinted on the nervous substance by particularly incisive, strongly 
energetic and infinitively repeated experiences, are material traces. Hering writes: “In 
our nervous system a material trace (eine materielle Spur) is left, a modification of the 
molecular or atomic structure”.  
Therefore Hering can lyrically conclude his conference stating that “the conscious 
human memory dies out with death, but the unconscious memory of nature is faithful 
and unextirpable: who succeeds in impressing on it the traces of his own actions, will 
always be remembered by nature”. 
In order to better define from a terminological point of view such material traces 
Warburg would borrow from one of Ernst Haeckel’s pupils and a follower of Hering, 
Richard Semon, the concept of engram. At the same time, Warburg borrows from him 
the concept of Mneme, a German grecism employed by Semon to refer not simply to 
individual memory nor to recollection, but rather to the general complex of collective 
unconscious memory. 
The term “engram” is often used by Warburg, and also modified into that of 
“dynamogram” (Dynamogramm): i.e. energetic (dynamis) sign (gramma), or into that of 
“symbol-preserve of energy (Energiekonserve-Symbol)”: engram, dynamogramm, 
symbol are equivalent terms in Warburg’s conception used to refer to a moment of 
accumulation of an energetic charge deriving from a sufficiently intense and often 
repeated event capable to inscribe itself indelibly in the collective memory as a material 
track. 
What kind of event could be such one? As intense as a traumatic event, belonging to 
originary archaic pathemic experiences, powerful enough to leave a trace on the nervous 
substance of our forefathers. Such experiences have possibly to do with moments of 
powerful religious enthusiasm within archaic human communities, first of all with 
frenetic and orgiastic dionysiac rituals. Here Warburg thinks the matrix of the engrams 
should be seeked. Here Phobos (fear, anguish, angst) acts as an Ur (origin), as an 
originary power appointed to coin the forms. Warburg defines the transmissible 
patrimony of such traces a “heredity of phobic engrams”.   
In his life-long somehow obsessive research, Warburg particularly focused on two 
emotional moods which according to him (and to his typically very German dualistic 
and polarized forma mentis…) represented the two polar pure extremes of any 
determined concrete emotion: mania and melancholy, the first connected with ecstasy, 
enthusiasm and possibly ritual homicide, the second related to depression, spleen and 
possibly suicide. From a figurative point of view, he saw such poles epitomized by the 
two emblematic figures of the ecstatic Nymph and of the depressive fluvial divinity, the 
River-God. Both are characterized by a certain bodily posture: on one side, noteworthy 
is the peculiar angle of the nymph’s foot in each of these ecstatic female figures, which 
obsessed  the charachter of Wilhelm Jensen’s short story Gradiva, analysed by Freud 
and by the Surrealists. On the other side, we can remark the reclining body of the 
melancholic river-god, which became a topos in the representation of such psycho-
physic atmosphere. 
Warburg wrote in his journal: “Sometimes I feel like, in my role of psycho-historian, 
I have tried to diagnose the schizophrenia of the West through the autobiographical 
reflex of its images, The ecstatic (maniac) Nymph on one side, the distressed 
(depressive) fluvial divinity on the other side”. It is also quite remarkable that Warburg 





himself was found psychically suffering from that same polar disease, if we trust the 
diagnosis of his famous psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Ernst Kraepelin. 
 
5. Model as Vor-Bild 
Let’s go back, then, to Manet’s chain. If the relation among Manet, Tivoli, Raimondi, 
Raphael and Villa Medici is actually an engrammatic one, that is based on the heredity 
of archaic traces, it should be possible, moving from the last derivate image, to re-
ascend backwards to the Prime Mover of the chain itself, to the very material origin of 
it. 
Warburg is quite self-confident: Manet’s Déjeuner, which became famous as a 
critical point breaking the figurative tradition, relies on the contrary upon “an ancient 
model  (Vorbild)” (the hellenistic relief) through an “Italian mediation” (in three main 
moments: Tivoli, Raimondi, Raphael), and the whole relation of all these figures can be 
determined “with an exactness such as only seldom was obtained in art-science”. The 
Tivoli-image is even characterised by Warburg as the discovery of a missing link, 
literally in Goethean terms as an answer to the “postulates of an intermaxillary bone”. 
Just like Goethe thought that the discovery of the os intermaxillare in the human 
osteological system had cancelled the pretension that human beings were different from 
other primates, Warburg feels that the identification of the Tivoli-image cancels the 
claim that Manet’s Déjeuner is separated from the previous tradition. 
Because of lack of time, we must now neglect a comparative analysis of the details 
which could show how actually the images of the chain differ from one another, and 
focus on the general affinity of them. Let’s just rapidly observe that such figurative 
chain contains both the maniac and the melancholic figure, therefore it can be 
interpreted as a sort of synopsis of the whole Warburghian research. 
We should rather concentrate on the arché or ‘principle’ which is the first starting 
point of the chain itself: it seems that such primary image is conceived by Warburg 
ontologically as a real object, and chronologically as a precedent: in other words, we 
have here to do with an original image, in the sense of a work of art which actually 
existed in a past time, in “ancient times” (possibly Greek), an image that Renaissance 
and modern artists could directly see or indirectly grasp through the mediation of other 
works which quoted it or hinted somehow at it. Such direct or indirect vision is the 
condition of possibility of imitation, mimesis, repetition of the ancient model or type in 
the new image; in this way the ancient figure survives, is born again, is rediscovered, 
awakes. In such perspective the “model” is to be understood – according to the German 
term Vorbild – as a Bild (image) which stands vor, in the double meaning of this prefix, 
both spatial and temporal: vor (in front of) the Renaissance artist’s eyes, as an image to 
be imitated; vor (before), preceding him in the linear development of art history. 
But the model as a Vorbild raises more questions than answers. In more than one 
occasion, when the characteristics of such original image are to be precisely established 
and described, Warburg cannot victoriously appeal to that “exactness” boasted in 
Manet’s case. Here are some examples:  
a) the Arch of Costantin – a most important source for the books of archaeological 
drawings used as typological manuals by the artists in Renaissance –, shows reliefs 
which are fragments of an enormous frieze which “most likely celebrated Trajan’s 
victories against the Dacians in a building of which we have no memory”.  
b) the Greek original which inspired the engraving of Mantegna’s school used as a 
model by Dürer to represent Orpheus’ Death “goes undoubtedly back to an ancient 





work, now lost, representing Orpheus’ or perhaps Pentheus’ death”. The 
unquestionability of the identification of the model contrasts with its absence (it is lost) 
or with its oscillation (perhaps Orpheus, son of the Tracian king Eagrus and of the Muse 
Calliope, torn to pieces and beheaded by the Maenads by order of Dionysus; perhaps 
Pentheus, king of Thebes likewise lacerated by the Maenads and beheaded by his 
mother Agave). 
c) For Antonio Pollaiuolo’s David fighting against Goliath, “it seems to me beyond 
all doubt that the model was a figure like the pedagogue of Niobe’s daughters”. 
Unfortunately, what seems particularly “ancient” in Pollaiuolo’s work - young David’s 
head – could not follow any model, because as Warburg himself recognizes, “the 
pedagogue was found without his head”.  
d) Problems are to be found even as regards our Manet’s chain, apparently the most 
“exact” reconstruction, although it is based on one of the “ancient stone sarcophagi 
which, distributed in all Rome as monumental remains even in churches, represent in 
early Renaissance the main vehicles through which the world of pagan divinities could 
be physically preserved in modern age” (the physical material trace!). The sarcophagus 
of Villa Medici, actually, physically “transmitted” its main motives to Raphael’s 
drawing and Raimondi’s engraving. But the latter shows a decisive, unfaithful 
“modification (Veränderung)” if compared to the ancient relief, “diverging in this way 
from the ancient scheme”: in Raimondi we do not find Tellus, the Lady of Earth; 
moreover, the pagan nymph who in the ancient relief stared upwards, in Raimondi gazes 
at the observer; finally, in the engraving we find a naked woman throwing her clothes 
behind her back: “On the sarcophagus such motiv is not present. It has probably been 
elaborated on the model of an ancient statue and transposed” to this modern figure”. 
Once again, the ancient model is missing, is probable, is hypothesized. We can perceive 
a drift from the “exactness” of the Vor-Bild to the mere probability of a not well 
identified “ancient statue”.  
Such drift raises serious questions around the issue of the model interpreted as a 
Vorbild, as an original image. 
 
6. Original and originary 
The uncertainty of the result of an archeological quest hunting the original prime 
mover of a certain series or chain of images is an ancient problem, very well described 
(more or less in the same years of Warburg’s activity) by Thomas Mann in the prologue 
of his tetralogy on Joseph and his brothers: “Deep is the well of the past. Shouldn’t we 
call it unfathomable?”. In the tetralogy, quite clearly, the historical source is 
transformed by Mann into a mythical origin, which cannot be neither directly exhibited 
nor situated in a particular moment of the linear representation of chronological time. 
Myth never properly happened as a historical event, nonetheless it is active in any 
historical process, informing it as its condition of possibility: it is the eternity of what 
never was. 
It is very remarkable that an author at whom both Thomas Mann and Warburg, 
independently, looked as at a master, Goethe, had encountered the same difficulties in 
his researches of natural science, especially in botanics and osteology. While searching 
the Urpflanze (the original plant) and the Urwirbel (the original vertebra) from which 
all vegetal and osteological phenomena would derive, he understood − at a certain point 
of his voyage to Italy − that the Ur, the origin, was not to be seized as an actual physical 
phenomenon, the very first one, really existed on earth at the beginning of the world. Ur 





was rather to be grasped as the immanent origin of any phenomenon, as its invisible 
condition of possibility, which inhabits the single phenomenon and which makes it 
possible and real. The original plant becomes therefore the originary plant: not the most 
ancient plant ever existed, but the leaf, which, transforming itself through expansion and 
compression and elongation and shortening becomes all the organs of any plant (both of 
the ancient and of the present ones, regardless of the historical time of their existence). 
Such approach was called by Goethe morphology, that is a study of the forms (morphé) 
of nature, describing not how the single forms look like, but what makes them possible 
and recognizable. Adopting a musical metaphor, we could say that the originary form is 
like a theme which is never given in itself, but only in its variations.  
Such morphological approach, not very successfull in Goethe’s time (he was 
notoriously accused of being a naturalistic amateur and not a real scientist), knew a 
revival in the Twenties of 20th century (much earlier than the theories of the origin as a 
“secondary-primary” as developed by the post-fenomenologists and post-structuralists à 
la Derrida). We could mention, from very different fields, Th. Mann and T.S. Eliot, 
Propp and Jolles in the literary theory, Spengler and Frobenius in the philosophy of 
culture, Husserl, Simmel, Benjamin and Wittgenstein in philosophy, Wölfflin and 
Warburg himself in the so-called Kunstwissenschaft, the science of art. 
Warburg early (1907) aknowledged his debt towards Goethe’s Metamorphosis of 
Plants (1790), even if he never seemed to deliberately replace the traditional historical 
model with the morphological model: the two paradigma cohabited in his research, 
sometimes in a mutual help, sometimes (perhaps more often) in a reciprocal unsolved 
contrast. 
According to such morphological (we could say “typological”, as well) model, the 
relation of images connected by what Wittgenstein would call a “family resemblance” is 
not to be represented on a chronological line going from the most ancient (never to be 
determined, as we have seen) to the most recent. Their relation is an equidistant 
reference to an energetic center, which makes them possible but is never given in itself, 
as a theme of infinite possible variations. 
Art history, in such perspective, could therefore be quite paradoxically defined as a 
tireless unprecedented repetition (=mnemic recollection) of something which was never 
given. 
. 
My main concern, in this research, is to try and understand how the theories of the 
mnestic material traces, developed by Hering and Semon and used by Warburg to 
explain the collective memory of the images, relate to the non-material originary forms 
(in Warburg’s terms, the Formeln, the formulas) as conditions of possibility of any 
representation, as suggested by the morphological approach. That is, to try and 
understand how the original relates to the originary.  
 
